U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C.
ORAL ARGUMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:

SMITH FARM ENTERPRISES, LLC: CWA Appeal No.
: 08-02
Docket No.
CWA-03-2001-0022 :
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Tuesday,
July 20, 2010
Administrative Courtroom
Room 1152
EPA East Building
1201 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC
The above-entitled matter came on
for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m.

BEFORE :
THE HONORABLE KATHIE A. STEIN, Environmental Appeals Judge
THE HONORABLE ANNA I. WOLGAST, Environmental Appeals Judge
THE HONORABLE CHARLES J. SHEEHAN, Environmental Appeals Judge

APPEAFANCES:

On Behalf of Smith Farm Enterprises, LLC,
HUNTER STMS, JR., ESQ.
of: Kaufman s Canoles, F.C.
150 West Main Street, Suite 2100
Norfolk, VA 23510
(757) 624-3272
(757) 624-3169 fax
and
IAJUANA 5 . WILCHER, ESQ.
of: English, Lucas, Priest \& Owsley
1101 College Street
P.O. Box 770

Bowling Green, KY 42102
(270) 781-6500
(270) 782-7782 fax

On Behalf of the Environmertal
Protection Agency Region III:
STEFANLA D. SHAMET, ESQ.
of: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region III
1650 Arch Street
Mail Code: 3RC20
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029
(215) 814-2682
(215) 814-2603 fax

ALSO PRESENT:
JAMES BOYD
DONNA CAMER-TAL
EURTKA DURR.
KARYN WENDELOWSKI

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MS. DURR: Environmental Appeals Board of the United States Environmental Protection Agency is now in session for oral argument, in re Smith Farm Enterprises Lic, docket number CWA-03-2001-0022, CWA appeal number 08-02. The nonorable judges Rathie Stein, Anna Wolgast, Chaxles Sheehan, presiding. Please turn off all cell phones and no recording devices allowed. You may be seated.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Good morning. We're here today pursuant to the Board's order of May 13th in Smith Farm Enterprises, and pursuant to that order, each side will have thirty minutes for argument, and Smith Farm may reserve five minutes for a rebuttal, if you choose. And, counsel, when you make your argunent, if you could state your name for the record. And with that, I think we're ready to proceed.

MS. WILCHER: Thank you very much. I'm Laduana wilcher with English, Lucas, Priest and owsley, We are also represented by Hunter Sims of Kaufman and Camoles, representing Smith Farm Enterprises Lic. Also at the table is Jim Boyd, who is one of the ownexs of Smith Farms. We would like to reserve our five minutes for rebuttal, please, and I would also ask the Board's indulgence, since I'm relatively new to this very long case, should I need to confer with Mr. Sims or Mr, Boyd during the course of this discussion. Thank you very much.

I'm here today because this is actually a very, very important case. It's an important case both to the -- the Boyd family, both in cerms of the emotional and Einancial toll it has taken over the last eleven years, but also because of the important policy questions that are presented beroxe this board, especially in the light of the Jurisdictional determinations under Rapanos.
which is clearly the subject of our conversation today.

Toward that end, we would like to just bxiefly call to the Board's attention a short history of the case, going back to 1998 and 1999, when drainage ditches were constructed on Smith Farms in some wooded areas, dxaning that -- that land. The -before the project began and was undertaken, Mr. Boyd contacted and met with the Army Corps of Engineers, asked for their opinion concerning jurisdictional issues and other issues conceming e permit. The corps of Engineers certainly never indicated in any fashion that there was a problem at thet time jurisdictionally considering the work that was anticipated to occur.
of course we're here today largely because the whole jurisdictional issue has been turned up on its head by Rapanos in 2006. and I can certanly say that we would be in a Very different situation were it back to 1989
or 92 or $\cdot 93$, when I was at the Agency and dealing with issues, when then, the only thing that was necessary for the Agency to prove was that there were waters of the united States, including wetlands, that is, lands that were inundated or saturated by surface or ground water such that they could and ordinarily did support a prevalence for vegetation typically adapted to life in saturated soil conditions. We always referred on the Riverside Bayview case, and extended the adjacency of the wetlands to a navigable water beyond that, such that any time that there were wetlands that they were considered to be jurisdictional, and enforcement action would have been considered proper.

In the Rapanos Case the court talks about the expanding jurisciction by the Corps of Engineers and certainly, by extension, to EPA, when in many of those circumstances, EPA was pushing the Corps to expand their jurisdiction. And the court
points out that the Corps adopted increasingly broad interpretations of its own regulations. Talked about the migratory bird rule. It talked about how the corps had expanded its own interpretations of the definition of tributaries to include ephemeral streams and those that ran through drainage aitches. And then the plurality opinion goes on to clarify that that type of regulation was never intended to be covered by the clean Water Act as waters of the U.S. Some of the key --

JUDGE STEIN: Ms. Wilcher?
MS. WILCHER: Yes?
JUDGE STEIN: Has any court held that the plurality test alone determines jurisdiction?

MS. WILCHER: I do not believe that any court has held that the plurality test alone confers jurisdiction. JUDGE STEIN: Okay. MS. WILCHER: I assume that the court wants to hear about that since it is an
important part of the decision. And we can talk about significant nexus next, if that's okay, or if you want me to go to significant nexus now, be happy to do that.

JUDGE STEIN: No, that's fine, you can talk about the pluralities first, but let me ask you if we were to find that the evidence met, as Judge Moran found, the significant nexus test, but for whatever reason it didn't meet the pluralities test, then what is the outcome?

MS. WILCHER: Now that's a very good question, and, actually, no one knows, and no one knows in the Fourth circuit, specifically, what the outcome of that -- what the outcone would be. The Rapanos test -unfortunately, in an effort to reign in jurisdiction by the corps and EPA, created probably as many questions as it did answer. and it's created a lot of additional litigation. So we're here, sympathetic to EPA's plight of having to try to figure out
what that means, and the regulated community also trying to figure out what it means because it is simply not clear. The Marks case that said that you would select the most narrow of the interpretations in a case such as this might be difficult to apply because it's hard to figure out what the most narrow definition or application of this case would be. Obviously, from Smith Farm's standpoint, we would be really delighted should this board dectae to follow the Marks opinion and decide that the scalia test would be the most appropriate here, but we're perfectly prepared to address both.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But that is -- but you're assuming that the narrowest grounds would then be the pluralities test as opposed to, say, the narrowest ground simply being that they rejected the Rapanos evicence and remanded the case. In terns of what -- what five justices could agree to. It was simply remand.

Ms. WILCHER: That's right. That's right. But it's presumed that the court's reasoning and the four -- the opinion of the four written by scalia; the opinion of Roberts; the opinion of Justice Kennedy, all meant somechirg, and that is what we are left to work within, and ---

JUDEE SHEEHAN: What do you think of the government's argument that either test can apply as the First and Eighth Circuits have held?

MS. WIHCHER: Well, clearly a number of circuits have held that either test would apply, and in this case, we -- we believe that the evidence despite what the ALIs have found, we believe the evidence clearly shows that uncer neither test would this area considered to be jurisdictional under the current interpretation of the Clean Water Act under Rapanos.

And I -- I really do think that. not wanting to lose the forest for the trees
here, the forest -- the big picture is that Rapanos is a dramatic shift in the way business as usual has been done at these agencies from 1972 until 2006. It is -- well. in 2001 you had a littie deviation here. but it's a huge difference, and what we find in the brief -- and what we find in the brief of the government in this case, is not much of a difference from how the law previously was interpreted, and 1 '11 -- I'11 just go ahead and adress that issue, and that is that the - - the strongest argument, it appears, that the government makes in its brief, dealing with the significant nexus test. is that wetlands are important. wetlands provide valuable functions, and even Rapanos case notes that the Clean Water Act has been very important and serves an important public interests, and section 404 and the wetlands laws in particular provide an important public interest.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, isn't the
government's argument that these wetlands, in particulam, are important, and can you address how these wetlands do or do not meet the Kenmedy mignificant nexus test?

MS WIECHER: That would be the goverrment's argument, but in this case they have failea to -- to introduce, by a preponcerance of the evidence, that that is the case.

JUDGE WOLGAST: COuld you describe for us what you believe the goverrment would have to show at a minimum to meet Justine Kennedy's significant nexus test in this context?

MS. WILCHER: At a minimum, they would have to show some measure of the effect that would be had by this wetlands property upon a navigable water of the United States. and they have not done so in any regard.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Wasn't there abundant testimony, says the government, by expert witness Martin and others that there
was such a connection? You're speaking very theoretically; I'd like, if you could, to get specific about whet you think the failures are in the govermment's case on the Rennedy test.

MS. WILCHER: Yes, but if you -fine, if you look at the government's argument, one of their lengthy arguments is about the impact of denitrification, that wetlands provide an important denitrification issue, pointing out that the Chesapeake Bay has too much nitrogen and that it's important to keep that out. They talk about the fact that nitrogen comes from atmospheric deposition. They talk about the fact that microbes in the soil will break that nitrogen down, and then they talk about that once the nitrogen is broken down it'11 be taken up by the breeze, and it may even be given off again into -- into the air.

TUDGE STEIN: Wasn't thexe plentiful testimony by government witnesses and the company's witnesses as to what was
occurring specifically at this site? I mean, I think the challenge for the company in this apoeal is that there were credibility findings that were made by the ALJ as to some of the testimony by respondents: by the compary's witnesses, and given the Board's standard for credibility deteminations, where the Board, you know, historically over many many years gives great weight to an AlJ's finding, how is it that we can overlook the ALJ's credibility detemminations in the face of countervailing evidence that the ALJ found to be credible?

MS. WLLCHER: Judge Stein, if I can finish Judge Sheehan's question, I'11 get right back to you on that. You were wanting some specifics and an example of what the goverment tried to prove in its case. By going through this whole denitrification process, they make no distinction between the value that this particular wethand is making, or any particular wetland is making, to the denitrification of the Chesapeake Bay --

JUDGE SHERHAN: But the Rennedy test says that if wetlands alone, or in combination with other wetlands, have that kind of effect --

MS. WTLCHER: Wetlands alone or in combination with other wetlands, or in combination with the uplands, the arguments that they are making would apply equally to uplands, and as the court noted in the Rapanos decision, applying some of these tests as the goverment historically has applied them to say that they are jurisdictional simply because they have value, and may be somewhat miles away but may have some comection or some value, miles away, being speculative in nature, does not cause it to be Jurisdictional, and it said if so the entire United states would be considered regulated undex the Clean Water Act.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: There's -- there's one, and not to get in the way of Judge Stein's question, but one of the exilbits,

Remand Exhibit 937, shows a very honeycombed tissue through the Smith Farm wetlands, going out to the two rivers and then to the bay. It looks sure --. surely to me it looks from this exhibit and others as if the wetlands are very proximate to and affect directly the waters below. Can you address that?

MS. WILCHER: I will. Those maps do not show any actual measurable connection, nor do they show a continuous surface comection navigable waters.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why does it have to be a surface connection? Why can't it be subsurface, if chere's a hydrological link?

MS. WILCHER: But there's no showing of a sub-surface hydrological link either. There's a total lack of evidence, of probative evidence, in this case to actualiy tie that particular wetland to a navigable water, which by the way, you would have to go from that wetland to a drainage ditch, and I went out there and traipsed down the site
before I came here to talk to you about this, but you'd have to go from that -- but this is all on the record -- you'd have to go from that area that might be-- that part of it that might be considered a vetland, through drainage ditches, that are only intermittent in nature, and the evidence is clear that they're only intermittent in nature, including the USGS blue Iine doteed lines, and then they would have to go from there to Bailey Creek, non- navigable, to Drum point creek, non-navigable: then to tributaries of the westem branch of the Elizabeth River, which is the first time you'd hit a navigable water. If you go in the opposite direction they would have to go from drainage ditches to Quaker Neck Creek to Deans Branch, which are tributaries of the navigable water, the Nansemond River. And so there - - there is no proof that thexe is a connection.

Things could have been done. There could have been dye tracings; there could have
been all kinds of evidence. They could have taken samples; they could have done quantitative analysis. There is no chemical evidence, there is no physical evidence, there is no biological evidence that connects this to a navigable water, and therein lies the problem.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Just a -- if I could follow up on that before we get back to credibility issues.

MS. WILCHER: Okay.
JUDGE WOLGAST: Are you saying that the fact they flow through ditches is a jurisaictional problem?

MS. WILCHER: Not particularly. JUDGE WOLGAST: And then getting back to the testimony that Judge Sheehan was referring to where Judge Moran was referring to the testimony of Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Martin, that the property provides flood storage, flow moderation, carbon sequestration, water purification, denitrification, what I want to
understand about your argument is are these aspects insufficient, or would they be sufficient if, in your mind, there was more evidence of the connection of these attributes to the Nansemond or Elizabeth Rivers?

MS. WILCHER: EFA -- the government can't simply say that wetlands are valuable because they are-- help prevent flooding, and not show that they would help prevent flooding in this particular case and that it would significently help prevent flooding in this particular case. What they have done in the brief is to simply lay down the well-know attributes and valuable functions and values of wetlands, and said, therefore, this is having a significant effect on navigable rivers. There is not a comection; they have not shown, by any credible evidence, cause and effect, of any significant impact upon the navigable rivers.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But you make, again, a very theoretical axgument about the

Fact that the govermment just argues wetlands generally, but werent government witnesses crawling all over this property multiple times, testifying at great length, lows of exhibits, aerials, historic maps, and everything else to show in this case. for this property, there was that link? It's hard to believe with all that massive testimony and getting to the credibility issue that the goverment doesn't have a pretty solid case that that nexus satisfying the kennedy test exist.s.

MS. WILCHER: It is hard to believe. I totally agree. It is hard to believe. The govermmert has had unfettered access to this property for over a aecade and have failed to develop flow drainage elements; they can't show how much flows off the site; they can't show what type of sedinent runoff might have occurred at the site; they can't show what type of water retention is held by the site; chey have been unable to show any
ecological connection with regard to wildife; there was a woodcock seen on the site. There is absolutely -- and it's amazing to me that there is a void.

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't the test a nexus, a significant nexus, not this substantial impacts test that $I$ hear woven through some of your statements, $\quad$ nd $I$ don't -- when I go back, and I look at the Kemedy opinion, you know, and some of the things that are cited, I don't necessarily see that that test requires the level of proof that you're suggesting is required by that test. so perhaps you could explain to me, based on the Kennedy opinion, how you get from there to the level of proof that you're asking for, just to establish jurisdiction.

MS. WILCHER: Certainly.
JUDGE STEIN: I mean, we're not here to determine, you know, penalty or anything else, we're here just to figure out if you're even in the door.

MS. WILCHER: Yes, I understand. Well, what Justice Kennedy said was to talk about the way the coxps had typicaliy regulated wetlands, and then to say, absent more specific regulations, however, the corps must establish a significant nexus on a case by case basis, when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to non-navigable tributaries, and then it goes on to say, given the potential over breath of the corps's regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the statute.

The justice mrote, not just a nexus, if the court had only said there has to be a nexus, then one would have a different burden of proof; in this case the court said a significant nexus, and we have to assume that a significant nexus is meaningfui, that those words mean something. So there's a - - at least a two-step process. One to show that there's a nexus, and the other is to show that

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it's significant, and that is what the record is devoid of in this particular case.

JUDGE STETN: But it's not a significant impact; it's a significant nexus.

MS. WILCHER: That's right, a significant nexus. And the significant nexus must -- and if you read through the rest of the case, it talks about how -- that in order to regulate land as water, there must be some type of impact on the water.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Justice Kennedy also uses a phrase that I think is pertinent here; he says that the how -- how the proof is determined has to be done in a practical way, and it almost sounds as if what you're requiring is that the government set up flow meters of pour a vial of discharge into a ditch and see if it eventually ends up in the Chesapeake, or do something on a very impractical scale, to prove the connection.

MS. WILCHER: You know, this is a really important issue. The government has to do something other than to make allegations, especially in a cese where you're dealing with constitutional issues such as private property rights and how one can use his own property, or hers, and in this case, there are lots of things that EPA histoxically has done for typical NPDES cases. But when you before the Board on a NPDES case, there's at least some measure. If they had had pictures that there was a plume coming off of this wetland; if they'd done any flow caloulations; if they'd had any physical, chemical, biological evidence of a nexus and a significant nexus to the navigable waters, which again, are not the ditches, they are the ditches that flow to the creek that flow to the creek that flow to the navigeble waters, then it would be a different case, but that is not what has happened in this case.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Well, as you say, the government obviously has the burden of proof in an enforcement case, but is this the
same type of evidence that you think a landowner should undertake? I mean, obviously they have the burden to obtain a permit where there is potential jurisdiction.

MS. WILCHER: But if the person doesn't obtain a permit -- and the government thinks that they're in error, again, the government always has the burden of proof. JUDCE WOLGAST: Right, but I'm talking about getting a -- you know, standing in the landowner's shoes before we've ever gotten to an enforcement case, it -- it, I mean, I think there's some issue with, getting back to the supreme Court case, that one of the things that we're concemed about, at least Justice Scalia pointed to, was how much evidence, time, money, it takes to work through this process, and it sounds like the, you know, the advocacy here is that there should be more, not less.

MS. WILCHER: There should be something cone by the govermment in this
regard to actually prove a nexus and a significant nexus, and in this case, I can assure you, Judge Wolgast, that the lanowner has gone above and beyond the call of duty, going to the corps time after time, having the Corps out to the site, and having spent, talk about the time and money and investment having this case, as I understand it, having spent over $\$ 800,000$ in litigation costs to try to protect what was legal at the time that it was done, and so -- so there is a burden.

The government has the burden, and in this case, in chis particular case, they failed to meer it. I don't know why, haven't been involved that long; I would speculate that by the time the Rapanos case came along, it was just too hard to go back and find the type of probative evidence that would carry the day.

I do not necessarily think that It's an impossible task. There have been other cases that I've reviewed where the government
has introduced evidence of the flows; the amount of drainage that has occurxed; how much water might be taken up by wetland area, but none of that was done in this particular case, and, again, we can only speculated why that was the case.

JUDGE STEIN: How does the Sixth Circuit decision in the cundiff matter bear on your view that the -- you need some sort of laboratory analysis to prove this?

MS. WILCHER: Well, in that particular case, you don't have, as I recall, the -- the distance from a navigable water that we have here, and I think the farther you are away from navigable water, the harder it is to prove that there's any impact on that navigable water, and in this -- again, in this case, they are far away from a navigable water, and I think the reason that we don't see the proof is because it's not there; it's not developable, and that is why it is not here. Did you want me to --

JUDGE STEIN: I do want you to get the credibility question.

MS. WILCHER: I didn't want to forget your - -

JUDGE STEIN: No, while we were on this copic, why don't you address the credibility guestion.

MS. WILCHER: I think it's an important question. It's a real important question, and that is simply that, even though the regulations do provide that typicaily when the ALJ mears the witnesses and makes determinations of their creaibility, that typically this Board will defer to that. However, in this case, a careful review of the record shows that the ALJs just got it wrong, and it is Within this Board's prerogative to look at the -- look at the factors that -that the ALJs used in making theix determination, and make a judgment about whether those factors are sufficient.

A couple of examples. There was a
man who had lived on the farm for thirty years who testified that he'd walked over the farm for thirty years and testified that in fact, the streams, or the drainage ditches, were intermittent in nature and did not carry water all the time. Well, the judge in the decision said, well, I think he's a nice man; I think he's beholden to the Smiths, and he was just out on a walk, so totally just discounted his testimony, saying he was just out on a walk, as if that meant that somebody wouldn't notice --

JUDGE WOLGAST: Are you saying though that it would have to carry water all the time?

MS. WILCHER: No, no. But, but, it's clearly --- is not a navigable water nor it is adjacent, nor is the wetland adjacent to a navigable water, in this case. It flows -anything that flows off of that area that has been considered to be wetland by the government, flows through drainage ditches
that are only intermittent in nature, and therefore are not considered to be navigable waters, clearly, under the Rapanos decision.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But if the man walking the land said that they were intermittent, and you're saying intermittent doesn't matter?

MS. WILCHER: We're saying that -Judge Charneski, as I recall, said that there was a continuous flow of some kind, isn't that -- didn't Judge Charneski say that?

JUDGE WOLGAST: Well, Justice Scalia said that even after that --

MS. WILCHER: Right, right.
JUDGE WOLGAST: That --- that seasonal flow could establish jurisdiction under the pluralities test.

MS. WILCHER: But there's not been seasonal flow established in this case. You have somebody going out there on particular days, after these ditches have been dug, which we all know alter the flow in drainage: after
the ditches are dug, water goes to the lowest level, and so there's going to be more water draining out of there than there would have been in 1998 and 1999, and that -- that is clear that there is no evidence at the time this was done they were -- they were anything but intermittent and there's no juriscictional comection that they have proven to date.

JUDCE WOLGAST: And what do you think they would have had to have shown to show seasonal tlow?

MS. WILCHER: Well, they could have done something more than go out there nine times over the course of a year. They could have had aerial photographs taken. They could have -- well, first you have the usgs -you have the JGGS maps as showing it's intermittent, and thexe's literally no testimony on the record right now to show that they're anything but intermittent. Other than to say that if somebody goes out there nine times and looks at the flow and sees water
then --- again, keeping in mind this was years after the drainage ditches were dug. that were chaneling more water into the old one through seven drainage areas; there's nothing to establish what was there at the tire in 1998 and 1999.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And I think -isn't this what courts are struggling with in the sense that it's -- it's one thing to say it's intemittent, but is that good enough? I mean, don't you have to figure out just how much flow in, you know, what period of time, or, the idea that -- I don't -- if someone says that it's intermittent. I'm not sure that means it's in or out without furthex evidence.

MS. WLLCHER: Right. Well, that shows really the -- that shows arguably a connection. But how much tiow is going through there, whether sediment loading is going through there, whether there's an ecological connection through there, all these whethers lead to whether there is a significant nexus
to a navigable water, and if you look at some of the other cases there has been that kind of information introduced, and in this case there is none.

JUDGE WOLGAST: What case are you thinking of?

MS. WILCHER: I'm thinking maybe it was the Precon case in .-. in the Eastern District of Virginia. It's on appeal in the Fourth Circuit. It may have been that. But I'll be happy to provide sone cases -- a case or cases later on that show the type of evidence that has been introduced because I remember reading about them and can't think of the name right now.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: I want to go back for a moment to Judge Stein's question about credibility.

MS. WILCHER: Yes.
judge sheehan: So alJ Moran sat through days and days of testimony, on the bench, a lot of people in that witness chair.

He's there, he's on the scene, he's interpreting the way the witnesses speak and their basic cxedibility, which you can only do face to face in that way. What is it about What happened there that causes you to think there's some way, or some reason for us not to credit the typical deference we would extend. There must be some exception here that we need to know about for that to happen.

MS. WILCHER: Well, and there are a few facts that I think would be relevant to your consideration in that case. In the first instance, some of these witnesses that the ALu determined were not credible were stipulated as being expert witnesses, and that shows at least some level of credibility in the mind of the government with regard to whether they were experts in the field.

Second, some of the criticisms -in one case a oxiticism that an ALJ made of an expert witness was that he had not been to the site often enough, yet with one of the
governox's -- government's expert witnesses, that person had been to the site less times than the Gmith Farm's expert witress. And so there is a confounding sense that in this particular case for whatever reason, if the experts agreed with the goverment, they were credible, and that if they didn't, they were not.

It just seems highly unlikely that every single witness introduced by Smith Farms, and I've had the pleasure of working with Mr. Boyd, and it is just, I think, statistically unlikely that one could find that many un-credible witnesses, and in this case I do not believe that they were not credible. I believe they were as credible, and as I mentioned, in some cases were stipulated in being expert witnesses --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: So you didn't believe they were --

MS. WILCHER: I did not believe they were not credible, so I believed that
they were credible. And - - and it is somewhat confounding, other than to say that the closest thing that I could Eigure out was that if they supported the government's view they were credible, and if they did not support the government's view, they were not.

UUDGE WOLGAST: But dian't Judge Moran find that -- and to genexalize -.. that the witnesses failed to establish that to the extent there were wetlands, they were isolated by non-hydric soil? Wasm't that a central part of his credibility determination?

MS. WILCHER: Well, that's one of the findings that Judge Moran made, but in this particular case, keep in mind, it's not Smith Farms that has to show that there is a break or a barrier -- it's the government who has to show that thexe is a connection.

JUDGE WOLGAST: OE cOurse, I understand. Right.

MS. WILCHER: So there's certainly pockets of non-hydric soil in the area, and
for some reason EPA - - and again, this is just kind of amazing to me -- in a case that we've spent this long on, that EPA did not go out there and do a typical delineation of the site, and this is something that is typically done. It's amazing that EPA did not issue a cease and desist order as soon as they knew about it. There are many things that, to me, axe mazing about this case, that, quite frankly, are the reason that I came here to argue it. Because I'm a strong believer in protecting the Clean Water Act and in protecting wetlands, and you may or may not know from my history, I bear a lot of scars Exom having thrown myself in the body of wetlands protection back in the days, and I still believe it's an important thing to do. But I also believe it's important to follow the rule of law, and in this case, Mr. Boyd made every effort to follow the rule of law and I believe he did, and when it did not work out the way that EPA wanted the law to be,
this enforcement action cane forward, at a time -- and had they intervened early on in this case, they could have stopped. They knew months before the work was completed -- they knew months before the work was completed that there was ditching and draining going on there, and they did not move in quickly to try to resolve that case, and they could have -they could have stopped most of the so-called harm that they are now alleging, but chose not to do so. They did not do a delineation, they aid not introduce proof that this particular part of property has a significant nexus to Jurisdictional waters of the United states, to a navigable water of the United states, and that's the reason I'm here,

UUDGE WOLGAST: I see your time is expired, if there's no other questions?

MS. WILCHER: Thank you.
MS, SHAMET: Good morning, Your Honors. My name is Stefania Shamat, and I represent Region II in this matter,
specifically the complainants, who are the division directors for the Environmental Assessment and Innovation Division, and the Water Protection Division, at EPA, Region IIT. With me at counsel table, I'd like to introduce Donna Camer-Tal, who is regulatory counsel for the Norfolk District Army Corps of Bngineers, and Kaxen Wendelowski, who is with the office of general counsel, and also we have a distinguished guest I'd like to introduce -- sitting behind me is Dr. Dennis Whigham, with the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center. Your Honors, responders have cone - if i can get in a coupie points -- a good job of ofuscating what are really very. very simple facts here. The simple facts are that these are wetlands, performing documented functions that are delivered to tributaries. These wetlands are adjacent, physically abutting those tributaries and those tributaries Elow to traditionally navigable waters to the West, 2600 feet away; to the

East, 4200 feet away. In other words, the are wetlands adjacent to tributaries that flow walking distance to traditionally navigable waters. These wetlands were furisdictional under SWANCC, as respondent conceded, in clean Water Act Appeal number 05-05, when respondent reserved argument on jurisdiction, but chose not to raise it until there was a change in case law. They continue to be jurisdictional under any standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rapanos. The quantum of proof offered by the complainants in this matter not only exceeds preponderance of the evidence, it exceeds any quantum of proof required by Rapanos. In fact, it far exceeds it. Another thing that is obscured in the argument here by the respondents is that up until 2007, respondents had a different set of expert witnesses. It was those expert witnesses that complainants stipulated. Their expertise was in wetlands identification, and the connection of wetlands to waters of the united States.

Those witnesses largely agnee with complainant's version of the facts on the ground, and it want until 2007, when respondents hired a new set of expert witnesses, that any real dispute arose about what exactly was going on in the site. There was dispute about what that meant, but not exactly what the physical characteristics of the site were.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Counsel, could you address Ms. Wilcher's points that while there may be flow moderation, carbon sequestration, there may be some evidence that the government hasn't shown a nexus between those characteristics and the navigable waters?

MS. SHAMET: Sure. First of all, the evidence of the functions being performed on this site is not speculative. There are photo after photo and testimony after testimony, the government's evicence is based on established scientific literature that identifies something called field indicators
-- physicel characteristics on the ground -that, when identified, correlate to a specific function being formed by the wetland. In this case there are three, The first was flow moderation, and one of the physicel cheracteristics there would be such things as ponding -- you see a lot of water being captured in low levels, depressional levels, within the wetland. The record contains dozens of photos of that. The second is denitrificetion, and that is the microbes uptaking nitrogen in the soil. That indicator is something called modeling in the soil. It's a red splotch. Essentially it means that iron is thexe. That evidence comes not only from the complainants, but if one were to review the solls expert from respondent Dr. Parkex's -- or Mr. Parker's first expert report in 2003, he describes modeling in his soils. The third is primary production. That is, the contribution of a food source. Taking -transforming orgenics that are in the ..... in
nature into a food source in water that then transports that food source downstream to higher trophic organisms. The best evidence of that actually comes from one of respondent's experts, Dr. Cahoon, who photographed it, leaving the site. I can't find the photo at the moment, but I'll describe what he says: "Foaming at the confluence of the ditch, leaving the property, with ditches along the property boundary near the railroad. This foam was also sampled and examined microscopically -. it contained primary plant debris, some pollen and numerous small oil droplets. These oil droplets, in my opinion, were probably plant olls derived from decomposttion of the organic matter in this area." That description correlates perfectly with the description in the testimony in the remand hearing about what primary production is -- the transport of particulate and dissolved organics downstream as a food source. So the use of the $-\cdots$ the functions in this case are not speculative;
they're clearly being performed, they're clearly being documented as being performed on this wetland. There's also evidence of the hydrologic connection between this wetland, the tributaries, and the downstream traditionally navigable waters. Again, that comes both from complainant's experts as well as some of respondent's experts; one of respondent's experts described that hydrologic comection as such. He described the wetland as a table top on which somebody pours water; the water comes off of that table top into the ditches, and then transports down to the traditionally navigable waters. The same expert, Mr. Wolf, also agreed that the wetlands on the site were in fact hydrologicelly connected to the ditches, which form tributaries, and were in fact adjacent to them. So we also have function and we have transport. Now with respect to Ms. Wilcher's comment --

JUDGE WOLGAST: what is your
position on the type of evidence that you would need to show nexus of the characteristics you see on site, to the navigable waters?

MS. SHANET: My position is that we met it exactly and I would refer you to Justice Kennedy's opinion. Justice Kemredy identified the type of functions that he would consider to form a significant nexus traditional navigable waters, and those are precisely the functions that were identified on this site. Specifically, Justice Kennedy refers to slowing down of surface runoff, filtration and purification -- that would be in on 547 US 773 to 75 . He states with respect to wetlands, the rationale for the clean water Act regulation is, as the Corps as recognized, that wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other waters; functions such as pollutant trapping -- in other words, denitrification -- flood control, flow moderation, and runoff storage.

Therefore, the types of functions that we documented as being performed on this site are precisely the types of functions that Justice Kennedy identified, in his opinion, as the type of functions that form a significant nexus.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: In -- in your brief, on page 46 , you say that the kennedy Test requires wethands contributions to the physical, chemical or biologicat intecrity of downstream waters -- is it "or" or "and"? Your brief says "or."

MS. SHAMET: The brief says "or" -JUDGE SHEEHAN: Because if it can be just one of those --

MS. SHAMET: I believe Justice Kemedy did use "and"; however, it is clear that he does not require a function to contribute to all three factors, and that's clear from the function he identifies.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Then why did he say "and"?

MS. SHAMET: I think he said "and," but he had a "command," and he was referxing to list of examples, rather than a standard. With respect to Ms. Wilcher's comment that we don't have any photographs of plumes, as I indicated, if one were to turn to R EX 28 , which unfortunately $I$ can't find right now. which is Respondent's Exhibit 28, from the first hearing in 2003, Dr. Cahoon provides a picture of that plume himself. I would also point out that, with respect to denitrification, one wouldn't expect to see a plume -- that's the exact point; it's to hold the nitrogen on the wetland, not send it downstream.

JUDGE STEIN: How is the Rapanos significant nexus test different, if at all, from the nexus in Rivervien -- Riverside Bayview?

MS. SHAMET: Riverside Bayview assumed a nexus based upon adjacency; in this case, Justice Kennedy has asked that we
actually go forward and establish that the nexus exists, rather then simply assuming it based on adjacency.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: On page 41 of your brief you quote some of the testimony of the first Ald hearing, which sounds a little more tentative to me than you're sounding toay about the substantial nexus test being met. The brief, at page 41 , reads that these wetlands are "more likely to perform denitrification, more likely to allow for suspended settlements -- sediments to settle out, more likely to support a different suite of wildife species" -- that, to me, is language that's not quite as powerful as saying there is a substantial nexus met here, that just sounds - - - can you address what seems to be more diffident anguage in your brief than what you're articulating today?

MS. SHAMET: Well, as Your Honor pointed out, the Ianguage that you poimted to in the brief is from the 2003 hearing, before
the Rapanos case. As the Board is aware, the EPA agreed and argued that the evidence to satisfy Rapanos had not been fully developed as of 2003, and this precisely why we requested a renand.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But you're citing it here, filed long after Rapanos, as if it's still your position.

MS. SHAMET: I cited a lot of other evidence as well, Your Honor, including the testimony of Mr. Rhodes, the testimony of Dr. Whigham, and the testimony - - the further testimony of Mr. Martin. So, while that is a piece of eviance, it is certainly not the only evidence cited in our brief.

JUDGE WOLGAST: To go back to the point you were making earlier about how the -in essence, the three-part test is the same type of evidence you would look to to establish signifioant nexus, and Justice Kennedy did seem to speak to that, saying much the same evidence, referring to the Comps's
delineation manual type evidence, should permit the establishment of a significant nexus with navigable, in fact, waters, particularly if supplemented by further evidence about the significance of the tributaries to which the wetlands are connected. How does the government interpret the latter part of that quote?

MS. SHAMET: I think that the government needs to show, and has shown in this case, that there is an ability of those tributaries to connect the wetlands to a traditionally navigable water in such a way that the functions are delivered. In this case we have certainly shown the hydrologic connection; some of respondent's experts have agreed with us that that connection exists and that there is sufficient -- that there is water exchange there, and we've also shown that chere's proximity here; again, these are walking distance to traditionally navigable waters; this is not the Rapanos case, where it
traveled 32 miles. So we think we have met that burden here by showing the hydrologic comection and showing that these tributaries are capable of delivering the function. With respect to credibility, and the points that Your Honors asked of Ms. Wilcher, I would just point out that Judge Moran's credibility determination was based on demeanox and also on the facts of this case. An important fact to note, for instance, is, in the first hearing in 2003, respondent's soils expert. who laid a grid, found 53 our 55 samples hydric. The only two that were non-hyaric had - -

JUDGE STETN: I couldn't heax you. MS. SHAMET: Had 53 out of 55 soll samples he identified as hydric, in the site. The only two that were non-hydric, had nydric soils on either side. In the second hearing. Dr. Pierce testified that there was essentially non-hydric soils everywhere. And on cross-examination, he was asked, didn't you
find any hydric soils, and he said, oh yeah, I found them -- I just didn't click on my GPS locator and identify where they were and I just didn't report them. He only reported the non-thydric soils. That is the kind of thing that happened that caused Judge Moran to find a lack of credibility. With respect to Dr. Straw, Dr. Straw's expert report discussed undulations in the landscape that he interpreted to mean there were no wetlands there. On the stand, he conceded that there were no undulations on the landscape -- he had misinterpreted the aerial photo. More importantly, he conceded that he knew about that error before the hearing, and never corrected it, until cross-examination. Judge Moran had ample basis for finding no credibility on those witnesses.

JUDGE STEIN: Is it your view that the Board has no authority to overrule an ALJ's credibility determination?

MS. SHAMET: No, Your Honor, the

Board reviews the case de novo. While the Board certainly defer to the ALT's credibility determination, what I am saying that in this case, there is no basis for overturning it.

JUDGE STEIN: If we were to overturn it -- a credibility determination, what kinds of factors, in your view, should we be taking into account?

MS. SHAMET: I would think you would be looking to see whether or not the ALJ has a rational basis -- oh gosh, I hate to use legal standards like that -- but, some sort of basis on which he based his credibility determination; that he explained why there was a lack of credibility, and I think in this case he did so amply.
judge sheehan: if Ms. Wilcher's correct in characterizing the way testimony credibility went, it sounced almost like a hundred percent credit to government witnesses, and practically zero to cespondent's witnesses. If that's accurate --
just stipulating to that assumption - - if that's accurate, would that be a basis for not allowing deference to Judge Moran's credibility determinations -- if it's so lopsided?

MS. SHAMET: In this case I would say no, just simply because in this case we have a classic battle of the experts, but oddiy enough, the battling experts are all on respondent's side. And what we have are experts who testified in 2007, who flat disedreed with the testimony of respondent's experts in 2003 without any attempt by the 2007 experts, or respondents, to reconcile that testimony, Given that circumstance, it's not surprising that the experts in 2007 s testimony were given very little weight. One of the things that Ms. Wilcher referred to was unfettered access to the site. If anyone had unfettered access to the site, it was respondent, and yet there are no photos in the record showing the streams leaving the site
dry except during a drought.
JUDGE WOLGAST: But her point was that the government has the burden here.

MS. SHAMET: And the burden -- the government has met the burden. In fact, in this case, the preponderance of the evidence, literally, the only evidence, other than testimony by the site owner, testimony by someone who walks around a three-hundred-acre site hunting and looking for damage in the fields, which is what he testified he was doing there, and photographs taken during a drought. The overwhelming evidence is that the waters do flow on a regular basis. First of all, these waters have been mapped .-. the waters leaving the site -- as flowing water by USGS for half a century.

JUDGE WOLGAST: You mentioned that the waters flow on a regular basis. Is that a continuous basis?

MS. SHAMET: We would say it would be part of every year, Your Honor.

JUDGE SHEEFAN: Then why is that necessarily continual? The Scalia Test, now that we've gone to continual flow, is just that -- there has to be continual flow. He says even the least significant of the lake, river, oceans, or streams, the four water bodies, the least sigrificant steams has to have continual flow. Your brief, you repeatedly say -- make other instances that are to me a lot less confident than what Scalia seerns to demand. You say, page 31, the drains flow at least part of every year; page 35, at least some portion of every year, at least, at least, at least -- it comes up repeatedy in your brief, which could be just one rain event. So there's one rain, at least it flows one or two days after the rain, and that's certainly a far cry, I would argue. from continual. So can you address the seeming gap between your statements and what Scalia seems to demand as far as continual flow? MS. SHAMET: We would state that

Justice Scalia described relatively permanent waters. He made pretty clear what those were. He didn't require any specific number of days of flow -- what he did say was common sense and common usage distinguished between a wash and a seasonal river, and that's in footnote five; respondent likes to use the term intemittent a lot but the one thing it is clear from footnote 5 is that Justice Scalia does not give the term intermittent any regulatory import. Why? Because he specifically declinea to define it.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why doesn't he give it regulatory import, when at least seven times, by my count, in his opinion he says intemictent waters do not qualify as juxssdictional -- he even calls it an oxymoron at one point.

MS. SHAMET: Even though he does not - - he declines to define it. He says that there are definitions of intermittent, but he sees no reason to identify what those are
here, and then he specifically says, "we have no occasion in this litigation to decide exactly when the arying up of a streambed is continuous and frequent enough to disqualify the channel as a water of the United States."

JUDGE SHEEHAN: I know we can't -nobody knows what intermittent means with absolute rigor; that's obviously subject to interpretation. But the fact is, he contimually rejects intermittent waters, whatever that means, as jurisdictional, and you say intermittent doesn't matter. I don't know how you can say that in the face of all his statements that intermittent does matter.

MS. SHAMET: I think the evidence demonstrates pretty clearly that there is regular flow on a regular basis in these waters. A good example --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: I'm not talking about the evidence. I'm talking about the standard.

MS. SHAMET: The standard is that
there has to be a relatively permanent water. It can't be a wash, it can't be something that flows only occasionally, only in response to a very strong rainfall, it can't be a gutter. It has to be a geographic feature. And in this case we have USGS mapping these as geographic features containing watex for over fifty Years, which, if that's not relatively permanent, I'm not quite sure what would be. JUDGE SHEEFAN: Then how else -why else -- why is it that you cannot muster more behind your argument that these are Elowing drains than just saying at least part of the year contimally? You never say it's continual, you never say it's relatively permanent and not intermittent --- you seem to stay away from saying that, and it seems purposeful, because it happens so frequently. MS. SHAMET: We don't over-exaggerate our evidence, we say what it is. And in this case what were saying is we agree. These streams dry up for part of the
year. We've never argued that these were perennial streams, because they're not. They are streams that only flow for part of the year. But part of the year is good enough, under Justice Scalia's test. These axe not washes, they're not trickles. When they flow, they flow. As Judge Moran pointed out, the record is replete with photos of these streams flowing, and flowing with a good arount of water in them. Now for example --

JUDGE SheEhav: Flowing at least part of the year, right?

MS. SHAMET: Flowing at least part of the year. If I could get the photo up? An example is this series of photos, if we can get it up. If not, I'll just give the exhibit numbers. Not a perfect picture. This photo was taken in December 2006. As you can see, there's visible flow in the stream. And this is Complainant's Exhibit 328. Complainant's Exhibit 308 -- same strean, same location; you can tell by the cross. January 007 , still
flowing.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: What does that really prove? You could go out right after a rain as apparently happened; apparently Dr. Whigham went out after rain in 07 and Judge Moran noted that he was out two days after a big rain, so naturally, the drains were full, but showing us occasional --

MS. SHAMET: If you can show four straight months of flow, I think you're probably doing pretty good. This is one of respondent's exhibits. This is Dr. Straw's photo, taken in February 2007. This is Respondent's Exhibit 57pp.

JUDGE WOLGAST: I'm sorry, whose testimony was this?

MS. SHAMET: Dr. Straw's. The other
thing that is documented -- I'm just going to go ahead and give you April. April 2007, still flow, This is Complainant's Exhibit 391, and just in case we're worried about March, we don't have March 2007, we have March 2003.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: What drain is that? MS. SHAMET: This is Complainant's Exhibit 102L.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: What drain? MS. SHAMET: This is the portion of drain six- seven as it leaves the site, crosses underneath the railroad tracks to the west and leaves the site. We would also note that in the 2003 hearing, it was established and Judge Charneski accepted ordinary high watermark for the duration of the streams leaving the site, from the time they leave the site until the time they, walking distance away, hit traditionaly navigable waters. Now while Justice Scalia said that existence of an ordinary high watermark in and of itself does not establish jurisaiction, it does remain a fact on the ground that shows the presence of flow. Our brief did cite in a footnote a number of cases that describe what an ordinary high water mark means and what it basically means is that there's water there, on enough
of a regular basis, that there's no vegetation, and Dr. Straw, in pointing at that photo. 57pp, pointed out that there was an ordinary high watermark there. We believe that we have show through that evidence as well is that there's a regularity of flow through these water bodies. With respect to Ms. Whlcher's sumprise that EPA did not issue a cease and desist order, we in fact did. We issued an administrative order in 2000 . I don't have the record citation with me but $I$ believe it was testified to in the 2003 hearing, In addition, with respece to Ms. Wilcher's comment that EPA knew about the operation before it was completed, and didn't intervene, that is also not correct. In July of 1999, EPA contacted respondent and requested a site visit. At that time the work was not done. The site visit was scheduled in -- they did the scheduling in July and the vistt was scheduled in september, and in August respondent brought equipment to the
site and finished it up to present EPA with a fait accompli. Couple other points. There's been a number of debates in the brief about.-briefs about whether or not there are, in fact, wetlands on the site and whether or not they extend all the way to the tributaries. First of all, nothing in Rapanos altered the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, Public Law 102377, 106 Statutory at Large 1315, in which Congress directed the Corps of Engineers to use the 1987 wetlands delineation manual until a replacement manual was established. And the courts have recognized deference to the Corps's 1987 manual as the agency's interpretation of its own regulations. That manual was applied in this case. That manual, when applied in this case, identifies wetlands throughout the site. JUDGE SHEEHAN: Are these -- are these wetlands, these drains, are they fed by ary othex source than rain?

MS. SHAMET: No, Your Honor. These
wetlands are what are called the top of the watershed, and this is why water flows in two directions, off of this site -- it flows both west and east because it's at the top of the watershed.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: So any water on the site, it's all rain-fed?

MS. SHAMET: Yes. The seasonality of it, however, can be established through testimony regarding how the plants on this site interact with that precipitation. And that testimony discusses the relationship between what's called leap out and transpiration. In other words, when the leaves are on the trees, the trees are uptaking water from the ground -- from the groundwater table, and the groundwater table decreases, and that's why you see lower levels of water in the summer. During the winter, when the leaves are off the trees -- the trees are not transpiring yet -- the water table rises, and that's why these are seasonally flowing
streams and seasonal systems.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Is there any testimony in the record about the frequency of the rein? If rain is it, is the source, is rain something on this property that occurs fifty times a year, a hundred times a year, two times a year?

MS. SHAMET: Your Honor, in the 2003 record, I believe there was an exhibit. and I apologize that I can't name the exhibit number for you right now that identifies what a one year storm is, what a three year stom is, and what a five year storm is, in that county, and I apologize that I can't come up with the exhibit number for you right now.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, what's your recollection about it what it says, even if we don't know the exhibit right now? I'm just trying to get a bead on how -- whether it's typically dry or typically wet there. With xain.

MS. SHAMET: Your Honor, I can't
recall. I believe it's under an inch -- around an inch, but I can't say for sure; I look at a Lot of these for a lot of different areas and I don't want to get one mixed up with the other.

JJDGE WOLGAST: Whose testimony were you referring to when you were discussing seasonality?

MS. SHAMET: That was testimony of Mr. Martin. It is at Remand Transcript 1912, and Renand Transcript 354.

JUDGE STEIN: If the Board were to conclude that the evidence in this case meets the Kennedy Test, is it necessary for the Board to consider whether the evidence meets the plurality test?

MS. SHAMET: It's the position of EPA that satisfying either test wall establish geographic jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. As the Board noted, all courts that have so held have held that if one meets the Rennedy Tests, then that's satisfied. In
answer, actually, to one of your cuestions, I think, Judge Stein, there is one case. It's an unreported case out of the District of Hawaii that has held that the Kennedy Test is limited to isolated waters, and that you otherwise apply to Scalia Test, and that is Sierra vs. County of Honolulu, 2008 U.S. District LEXIS 64262, and we would just note that that case is inconsistent with the governing circuit law; it's the 9th Circuit, and we believe it's inconsistent with Headlesburg and Moses, but you did ask whether there was any case that ciscussed the scalia test, and that is the only one, at least I'm aware of. To answer your question, we believe that satisfying the Kennedy Test would be sufficient and it would not be necessary to reach the Scalia Test; however, we do believe that we've satisfied both in this case and that either test will do it. All through.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Can you point us in the record to what may not be a gap, but it
looks like a bit of a gap, at least from the briefs. There's a lot of testimony -- a lot of discussion in your brief about the history -the history on the site, water on the site; for example, a 1953 photo shows ditch one had water, a 1937 photo, one, two and four had water, 1920, USGS map had five -- ditch five had water. And then so we leap from sixty, seventy years ago to the present decade beginning in 1999 when a bunch of inspections occurred, mainly in 199, and there was some hopscotching, and then they ended in 2007. So there - - at least from the briefs there's a fairly big gap between the very, very historic maps and photos, and then the 1999-on inspections and what they showed. What about the intervening?

MS. SHAMET: I believe that we also discussed the usgs maps in 1994, which were the most recent maps prior to activity. As Your Honor's aware from the Board's decision in Bricks, it's incumbent upon us to show what
the waters were like before the activity, not after the activity.
judge sheehan: Right, but the before here is well before. That's my question. I don't see much except for that ' 94 map.

MS. SHAMET: And we also used aerial photography from 1994 and 1995 to supplement. There's been no evidence in the record that anything changed between 1994 and 1995 and the activity in question, which started in, I believe, December of ' 98 or January of 1999. And I believe respondents agreed on the western side of the site, in their expert report, that the configuration has been consistent since 1949, up until the time of the activity. If there are any further questions, I would just sumnarize again by pointing out that the facts in this case are very, very simple. These are wetlands, they're clearly documented as wetlands, the preponderance of the evidence established ther
as wetlands. The preponderance of evidence -the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence -- established that these wetlands are performing actual, documented functions. The very significant nexus that Justice kennedy described in his opinion. The evidence in this case shows that these wetlands are physically adjacent to tributaries. These are ditches, they are manmade, but I would just note that in Rapanos itself, the ditches were manmade and no fustices voted about that. They flow walking aistance to traditionally navigable waters, and they are jurisdictiond, Thank you.

MS. WIICHER: May it please the court. I want to thank counsel for raising the tabletop analogy because I forgot to. This is at a divide. It is twenty feet above sea level. It is a watershed divide like the continental divide, such that water is flowing away, it is not at the bottom of anything. It is no a maxsh, it is not a bog, it is not a
swamp. This is an area where there is no ability for the wetland to capture and keep pollutants out of a navigable water because it itself is at the very head of the watershed. And so trying to -- if you were able to be there and see that, you would understand that it's not got the same type of functions and values as some area adjacent to. belon, catching, preventing pollution coming from a lot of upstream areas. While that's not particularly significant --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Haven't you just helped make the argument that with gravity, working as it does, any discharge of a pollutant up high would have made its way dow 1ow, to a navigable water?

MS. WILCHER: Yes, so this is not a mountainous area. This is a very slight slope. In fact, to the naked eye it's almost hard to see a slope.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why does flow matter as significant nexus goes?

MS. WILCHER: Well, the amount of runoff, quite frankly, that would occur, can matter with regard to that. I do want to address a few absolutely incorrect things that were stated and a couple misconceptions. Let me start with the mischaracterization of the expert witnesses that were hired in 2007 . There seems to be some attempt to imply that hiring different expert witnesses to deal with whether this is jurisaictional under Rapanos is the same as having expert witnesses to testify whether or not this axea met the former -- the actual definition of a wetland. They're two different things. You can have a wetland and it can still not be jurisdictional. So it's our hope that the Board doesn't misconstrue that to say that by hiring different experts you were trying to get a different result, which was not the case -- it's simply that, if you're looking at how much flow, what the functions of values are, it's a very different thing from someone who
can go out and do the soil samples to determine what's hydric and what's not. Second, just as -- with regard to the credibility of the witnesses, just as there were some -- a case, perhaps, where an expert witness misstated something or changed its mind, so did some of the govermment's expert witnesses misstate something that then had to be corrected. So did the brief that said .... that took the word and "and" changed it to "or," with regard to what Justice Kennedy had written. So I don't think that that in and of itself has any significance with regard to the credibility of a witness. When we are talking about how far this land is from a navigable water, counsel has mentioned that it's 2600 feet, which is about half a mile, or 4200 feet, which is close to a mile -- that's not to reach a navigable water. Let us be clear. That is to reach something that is not necessarily an intermittent area. EPA stipulated, in the stipulations dated

Septenber 8th, ${ }^{2} 03$, that the water body depicted, and this is numbers 37 end 38 , that the water bodies depicted as these drainage ditches on the site are depicted by the USGS topo map at the Ballary Hill (Phonetic) quadrangle as a broken blue line and that a broken blue line denotes an intemittent stream. These are intermittent streams, and as Justice Sheehan has correctly noted, Judge Scalia says in many circumstances thet intermittent streams are not jurisdictional waters of the U.S. However, if we turn to what Justice Kennedy says, that's where we kind of get into the either/or, what we also find there is a great discussion by Justice Kennedy himself on the corps definition of a tributary. Counsel was referring to the drainage ditches as tributaries, and Justice Kennedy makes it clear that the corps definition of tributary, that was in effect at the time this decision was written, using the high watermark, was not appropriate, and would
lead in fact to too broad a definition of what was jurisdictional in and of itself, under the Clean Water Act. And there's -- we don't have time to read it all, but I'm sure you've probably read it more times than I have anyway. We'd also just like to mention that, quite frankly, the evidence that has been introduced in this case is the type of evidence the Court was hoping would not be used to prove jurisdiction on such an important issue, and that is it's speculative. It's not -- we're not arguing that wetlands aren't important, we aren't arguing that wetlands aren't valuable, and, you know, in 1990, we'd say regulate, because we had the legal authority to do so. This, again, is one of these cases that simply wishing that the Supreme Court had said something differently does not make it so. This is what the court said -- that's the final word on the matter, whatever we decide it is, but it's the final word, and we can't change that, regardless of
how important or how wrong someone mey think that it would be. Two other quick points to mention, and that is, EPA knew about this work that was going on in February of 1999, and that is in Jeff Lapo's testimony in Volume 1. page 167 through 169, so EpA did know. Most of the work was completed by Apriy or May of that year, before EPA every came out to the site and it wasn't until 2000 that a notice of violation was issued.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: So why does that matter? That's an enforcenent cholce EPA makes every day of the week, and it's not part of the record, it has nothing to do with whether or not the Kennedy or Scalja or any other test was met. It really doesn't seem to bear on the legal issues here.

MS. WILCHER: Faix enough. For purpose of this argument, for the purpose of today, you're probably right, Juage. But it does matcer if we're talking about typical practice of EPA, and while I'm well aware that
there's no requirement to take an enforcement action in anything less than this period of statute of limitations, if in fact this was as egregious and as violative and as problematic as counsel appears to make it seem, then EPA aid have every opportumity to stop that, and in many, many cases, when EPA sees a clear violation of the law, they simply issues a cease and desist order, and in a case like Rapanos, in the Rapanos case, you have people who are going out and taking action and violating the wetlands law after they've received many state and federal cease and desist orders, so the facts of this case are so different from the facts of that case. Here we have someone who was trying to comply with the law as it was written at the time; in my view he was complying with the law as it was written at that time, and the fact that EPA didn't like the way the law was written and what it said and what the courts were deciding, does not give them authority to come
in and regulate after the fact.
JUDGE WOLGAST: Counsel, thank you, you'se out of time, if you could make your Einel point in just the next thixty seconds, I think you said you had two; I may be mistaken.

MS. WILCHER: Thank you. Well, we are talking about jurisdiction. I do think that the overall issue of equity comes into play. And knowing -- even knowing what the Jurisdiction was at the time of the activities undertaken, is really kind of an uncleax matter. Were still struggling with what furisalction is. Regrettably, that's always been the problem with this program. The problem with this program is that Congress did not give us clear direction and clear guidance to either EPA or to the Boyds or to anyone else in the regulative community, and I think that's a factor certainly that the court wily consider, and should consider, when making a dectsion on issues of liability and in this
case we would ask that you do so. Thank you. JUDGE WOLGAST: Thank you. Counsel. thank you for your argument, and the case is now submitted.

MS. DURR: All rise. Session of the Environmental Appeals Board now stands adjourned.
(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter was concluded at 11:16 a.m.)

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the foregoing transcriptin the matter of：Smith Farm Enterprises．LIC
Before：Hon．Anna I．WolgastEnvironmental Appeals Judge
Date： ..... July 20； 2010
Place： washington， ..... D．C．
represents the full and complete proceedings of theaforementioned matter as reported and reduced totypewriting．

